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"RIGHT TO FARM" STATUTES-THE NEWEST TOOL IN
AGRICULTURAL LAND PRESERVATION
RANDALL WAYNE HANNA
The seemingly inexhaustible supply of agricultural land and
open space that America was so blessed with is rapidly diminish-
ing. In fact, the irretrievable commercial development of agricul-
tural land is reaching near epidemic proportions. Approximately
three million acres are converted each year from agricultural to
nonagricultural uses, with one-third of that coming from the na-
tion's cropland base.' In addition, "[b]y the year 2000, most if not
all of the nation's 540 million acre cropland base is likely to be in
cultivation."'
Several reasons have been cited for this rapid loss of available
farmland, including economic problems,' increased demand for ag-
ricultural exports,4 and urbanization.5
The decline has caused many to become concerned. s Worries
about losing cheap and dependable food supplies, disenchantment
with sprawling urban development, concern about the loss of rural
lifestyles, "a preference for the visual and aesthetic amenities asso-
ciated with rural land, and the belief that the decline of agriculture
as an industry will result in economic losses to local communities"
1. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, 1981 Final Report 8 (1981). The "cropland
base" is the number of acres of land in America that is suitable for growing crops.
2. Id.
In Florida alone more than 639,000 acres of "prime" farmland were shifted from agricul-
tural to nonagricultural uses between 1958 and 1977. Fla. H.R., Committee on Agriculture &
General Legislation, Staff Report, Agricultural Lands in Florida, 18 (1981). In addition,
since 1970 the state has lost more than 110,000 acres in citrus. Id. at 20.
3. See Wershow, Agriculture and the Law, 54 FLA. B.J. 29 (1980); see also Batie and
Looney, Preserving Agricultural Lands: Issues and Answers, 1 AGRIC. L.J. 600, 603 (1979-
80).
4. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1.
5. About 10% of the cropland lost each year is lost to urban development. Geier, Agri-
cultural Districts and Zoning: A State-Local Approach to a National Problem, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 655, 658 n. 11 (1980) (citing Krause & Hair, Trends in Land Use and Competition for
Land to Produce Food and Fiber, U.S. Dm'T OF AGRICULTURE, PERSPECTIVES ON PRIME
LANDS 16 (1975)).
6. An inherent human right to protection of the ultimate source of our nation's food
supply, the land on which it is grown can be judicially protected "against action
by any person or department of government which would destroy such a
right .. " As hunger stalks even our United States, there can be no more funda-
mental human right entitled to constitutional protection than the right to a share
in the natural abundance of our land.
Yannacone, Agricultural Lands, Fertile Soils, Popular Sovereignty, The Trust Doctrine,
Environmental Impact Assessment and the Natural Law, 51 N.D.L. REV. 615, 652 (1975)
(quoting Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 380 P.2d 34, 40 (Colo. 1962)).
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have all stimulated a variety of governmental efforts to halt the
conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses. 7
A discussion of the various policies and arguments behind the
preservation of agricultural land is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. However, the subject has been and will continue to be the
topic of discussion among many researchers, land use planners,
farmers and others. Once the decision has been made to initiate
programs to save agricultural lands, the states have a variety of
tools available to accomplish their purpose. This article will pre-
sent a brief analysis of the various mechanisms used to preserve
agricultural lands8 and then will explore in depth a dramatic action
that has been taken by most of the nation's state legislatures - the
abrogation of the common law nuisance doctrine as it relates to the
right to farm under certain circumstances.
I. VARIOUS TOOLS USED
A. Federal Programs
Until recently the loss of agricultural land had not been seen as
a national issue. However, as the issue has intensified in scope and
concern, several administrative and congressional actions have di-
rectly and indirectly affected the subject of preserving agricultural
lands.
The National Environmental Policy Act" and the A-95 Review
Process1" require federal, state, and local governments to consider
farming and farmland preservation goals when evaluating the envi-
ronmental impact of more than one hundred major federal pro-
grams. They must also consider the relation of individual projects
to regional comprehensive planning goals. But the impact of
these programs on the retention of agricultural land is questiona-
ble. Interviews with federal officials show that agricultural land
considerations must be more specifically designated in these pro-
7. Geier, supra note 5, at 655.
8. An in-depth presentation of the mechanisms used is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. It will only present a brief analysis of the federal and state programs designed to save
agricultural land. For excellent comprehensive reviews on both the state and federal laws on
the subject of farmland preservation see Batie and Looney, supra note 3; Keene, A Review
of Governmental Policies and Techniques for Keeping Farmers Farming, 19 NAT. RE-
souRcEs J. 119 (1979).
9. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4321-61 (Law. Co-op. 1982).
10. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Circular No. A-95 (1976).
11. Keene, supra note 8, at 123.
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grams or the "effective identification of adverse agricultural land
impacts will be limited. '1 2
During the Carter administration both the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration (FmHA), a rural credit agency of the United States
Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection
Agency adopted programs providing for review and attempted mit-
igation of federal agency impact upon agricultural land."2 For ex-
ample, one of FmHA's functions is to provide loans for multifamily
housing in rural areas. An approach taken in some states was to
require loan applicants to show that the land to be developed for
housing was not prime agricultural land and that no less-produc-
tive land was available. Initial reports show that the Reagan ad-
ministration is continuing this and related programs.14
Two of the more important congressional enactments touching
on the subject are the Tax Reform Act of 19761s and the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981,1" both dealing with estate and gift
taxes. Estate taxes have always been a major problem for farm
families because their primary asset, real estate, is included in the
gross estate at its highest and best use value.17 In order to pay the
large estate tax, it is often necessary to sell the farm. 8 This has
two effects. It deprives the family of the deceased of its main
source of income and it may remove productive land from agricul-
tural use if the purchaser chooses not to farm the land.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 allows the land to be assessed at its
value as a farm rather than its highest use value.1' The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 supplemented this by decreasing the
maximum tax rates of the 1976 act and increasing that portion of
an estate which can be devised without being subject to taxation.'0
Although it is too early to determine the impact of these statutes
12. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 76.
13. Id.
14. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,699 (1982). However, support for other farmland preservation
programs may not be as strong as may be inferred from the Reagan Administration's recent
opposition to S.1713, a bill designed to provide special tax breaks for the sale of farmland
development rights to state or local governments under qualified farmland preservation pro-
grams. Although expressing support for the idea of preserving farmland, Treasury Tax Leg-
islative Counsel William McGee testified that additional tax breaks are unwarranted. DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) No.100, at G-1-2 (May 24, 1982). See also infra notes 29-43.
15. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455. 90 Stat. 1520.
16. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
17. 1 J. WERSHOW, FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL LAW, ch. 10, 7 (1981).
18. Id.
19. I.R.C. § 2032A (1981). See also infra notes 47-61.
20. W ERsHOW, supra note 17, at ch. 10, 2 (citing I.R.C. § 2010).
1982]
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on the retention of agricultural land, the possibilities are great that
this expansion of the tax rules affecting farmers will encourage
families to remain in agriculture.21
B. State Programs
Since the passage of the Maryland preferential assessment law in
1956,22 almost every state has experimented with various methods
of preserving agricultural land. Nearly all of the activity, however,
has taken place since 1970.13
1. Agricultural Districts
Agricultural districts are designed to encourage farming. Unlike
zoning, the use of the land in an agricultural district is not com-
pletely controlled by the state's police power.24 Through a volun-
tary retention program, a single producer or several producers
form an agreement with the local governmental unit to retain their
land for agricultural purposes in exchange for tax and other incen-
tives.2 5 The acts are designed to "keep farmland in production, to
protect farmers from rising taxes, and to insure the economic feasi-
bility of farming by releasing some of the farmer's capital invest-
ment-all while allowing the landowner to retain his ownership of
the land."2 At least six states have some form of agricultural dis-
tricting program. 7 The effectiveness of these programs depends
upon the combination of the protective elements included within
the scheme. Most of the programs are too new to be evaluated.
However, statistics gathered from the New York program, enacted
in 1971, suggest that it has been successfu 2 8 and that agricultural
21. See Wershow, supra note 17, at ch. 10, 1-14.
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(b) (1957). The Maryland statute was declared unconsti-
tutional in State Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield, 161 A.2d 676 (Md. 1960). In 1961 the state
passed constitutional amendments which cured the defect.
23. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 63.
24. Batie and Looney, supra note 3, at 619.
25. R. Clouser and D. Mulkey, An Expanded Review of Agricultural Land Preservation
Programs and their Policy Implications 21 (unpublished manuscript on file at College of
Agriculture, University of Florida).
26. Wershow, supra note 17, at ch. 1, 4.
27. Clouser and Mulkey, supra note 25, at 21.
28. A total of 411 agricultural districts have been established in 79% of the state's coun-
ties, covering 16% of the state's land area. Estimates are that 53% of the agricultural land
in metropolitan areas is also part of agricultural districts. Clouser and Mulkey, supra note
25, at 25. But cf. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 65-66 (concluding
that the New York program has been ineffective on those areas with immediate prospects
for urban development) and Batie and Looney, supra note 3, at 621 (suggesting that the
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districting may provide a useful pattern for other states to follow
as a first step in the development of a comprehensive program for
the preservation of agricultural resources.2 9
2. Purchase of Development Rights
Under this program, the local government purchases the devel-
opment rights to a parcel of land owned by the farmer. This leaves
the farmer free to work the land at its current use. The public
ownership of an easement allows vigilant officials to restrain efforts
to develop the land.30 The tax burden is decreased because the as-
sessed value is reduced to reflect alienation of the farmer's devel-
opment rights. As an alternative, the farmer "may elect to give the
development rights to the government and receive a charitable de-
duction on his federal income tax.""1 At least seven states have
some type of program involving the purchase of development
rights.32 Because these programs are new, their full impact has not
yet been realized. Such a program is much more efficient than an
outright purchase of a fee interest because of lower initial costs, a
cash exchange for a right in the land, and the fact that an individ-
ual landowner continues using the land, thereby carrying some of
the tax burden."
However, several commentators have questioned the program
because the cost of acquisition to the local government is high and
the reduction of the tax base - with the consequent reduction in
tax revenues - may be significant. 34 The program may increase the
cost of production and encourage "small country estates" as op-
posed to commercial agricultural operations."6 In addition, the
costs of enforcement must be included.36 However, if the technical
and practical problems can be solved, purchase of development
agricultural districting in New York has been "relatively ineffective in reducing the rate of
conversion of agricultural land").
29. Myers, The Legal Aspects of Agricultural Districting, 55 IND. L.J. 1, 38 (1979-80).
30. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 66.
31. Wershow, supra note 17, at ch. 1, 5.
32. See Clouser and Mulkey, supra note 25, at 29-30.
33. Wershow, supra note 17, at ch. 1, 5. Of course, the tax rate will be lower because of
the reduced assessed value. Id.
34. Id.
35. Batie and Looney, supra note 3, at 609, citing Lesher & Eiler, Farmland Preserva-
tion in an Urban Fringe Area: An Analysis of Suffolk County's Development Rights
Purchase Program, AE Res. Pub. 77-3, Cornell University (1977).
36. Id., citing Coughlin & Plant, Less Than Fee Acquisition for the Preservation of Open
Space: Does It Work? AIP 452 (Oct. 1978); Comment, The Saskatchewan Land Bank, 40
SASK. L. REv. 1 (1975).
19821
420 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:415
rights programs should be helpful because it provides landowners
an opportunity to farm while being compensated for foregoing
more intensive development of their land.37
3. Transfer of Development Rights
A closely related concept to purchase of development rights is
the private market device of transferring development rights
(TDR's). Landowners in agricultural areas transfer the develop-
ment rights of their property to landowners in development areas
who wish to engage in higher density development. The local gov-
ernmental unit makes an initial determination of the size of the
agricultural area to be retained and then supervises the transfers.38
In addition to preserving agricultural lands, TDR's have been
used to preserve historic sites,3 to create incentives for low income
housing40 and to regulate land use generally.' 1
As with purchase of development rights programs, the transfer
of development rights creates an interest separate from the fee.
Once development rights have been sold, land use is limited to ag-
riculture, so the impacts may be permanent." However, the effec-
tiveness of the program is still being tested.4 3 Among the problems
found to date include the nature of compensation" and political
acceptability.
45
4. Tax Incentives
Real property taxes often can consume fifteen to twenty percent
of a farmer's net agricultural income46 and in many rural-urban
37. See Peterson and McCarthy, Farmland Preservation By Purchase of Development
Rights: The Long Island Experiment, 26 D. PAUL L. REv. 447 (1977). See also Wershow,
supra note 17, at ch. 1, 5; Batie and Looney, supra note 3, at 610.
38. See Clayton and Mulkey, FRE 32, Transfer of Development Rights, University of
Florida, 1980.
39. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40. J. DUKEMINIER AND J. KRIER, PROPERTY, 1202-03 (1981).
41. Id.
42. Clayton and Mulkey, supra note 38.
43. Transfer of development rights programs for agricultural purposes have been started
in municipalities and counties in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut and New Jersey. Clouser and Mulkey, supra note 25, at 36.
44. Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973).
45. Batie and Looney, supra note 3, at 618.
46. Keene, supra note 8, at 137, citing Regional Science Research Institute, Untaxing
Open Space: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Differential Assessment of Farms and
Open Space, 49-56 (1976).
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fringe areas they can equal or exceed farm income. 7 Because of
this and the concern that high ad valorem property taxes will lead
to the loss of agricultural land, nearly all states have adopted a
special method of assessing agricultural lands.48
The various methods used have been given different names and
labels, 49 but the one factor running through all of them is that
farmland is assessed not at 100% of its best-use value but at its
value as agricultural land.50
Many states use a preferential assessment system. Bona fide
farming operations are assessed purely on the basis of agricultural
use with no penalty if the land is converted to a nonagricultural
use. At least seventeen states have this type of pure preferential
assessment program.51 Although each of the statutes varies in some
way, Florida's statute is one of the strongest. The county property
appraiser grants the agricultural classification based on a set of cri-
teria including the size of the parcel, the length of time the land
has been used for agricultural purposes, whether the agricultural
use has been continuous, the price paid for the land, whether the
land is being cared for in accordance with accepted commercial ag-
ricultural practices and whether the land is under lease." Some
argue, however, that the pure preferential statute and others like it
subsidize developers and farmers, allowing them to hold land until
it can be converted into higher intensity uses.
Another approach to differential assessment for agricultural land
is the deferred tax method. The property appraiser records both an
agricultural use valuation and a full valuation of the property with-
out regard to its agricultural use. If the property is sold for a non-
agricultural use a "rollback" provision collects the difference be-
47. Id.
48. As of 1981, Georgia, Mississippi and Kansas were the only states without some form
of preferential use-value assessment program for farmlands.
49. See Currier, An Analysis of Differential Taxation as a Method of Maintaining Agri-
cultural and Open Space Land Uses, 30 U. FLA. L. Rav. 821, 821 (1978). See also Nelson,
Differential Assessment of Agricultural Land in Kansas: A Discussion and Proposal, 25 U.
KAN. L. REv. 215 (1976-77).
50. See Currier, supra note 49, at 821.
51. Clouser and Mulkey, supra note 25, at 5.
52. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1981). Florida was the second state to adopt a use-value assess-
ment program. The first was Maryland. See supra note 22. For an excellent synopsis of the
Florida law on the subject, see Wershow, supra note 17, at ch. 3.
53. Wershow, Recent Developments in Ad Valorem Taxation, 20 U. FLA. L. Rav. 1, 11
(1967-68); See Note, The Continuing Preferential Tax Treatment Accorded the Florida
Land Speculator, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 571 (1979); See also Cooke and Power, Preferential
Assessment of Agricultural Land, 47 FLA. B.J. 636 (1973).
19821
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tween the two assessments." In other words, the governmental
unit recaptures the tax savings if the landowner sells or grants his
land prematurely. At least twenty-eight states have some type of
deferred taxation program for agricultural lands. 5 Of course, an
advantage of a deferred taxation program is that it removes some
of the financial incentive for speculators to abuse the intent of the
law." On the other hand, some farmers will be penalized even
though they have sold their land for what they consider legitimate
reasons.
Some states with preferential programs have opted for a rather
unique system of restrictive agreements. The landowner agrees to
restrict the use of his land for a period of years in return for tax
concessions.
Because of increasing urban pressures on fringe agricultural
areas, the various ad valorem assessment programs have had their
share of problems. 8 In addition, some commentators contend that
although differential assessment has been praised as a way of pre-
serving agricultural land, the results have been quite the oppo-
site . There have also been several state constitutional questions
regarding the preferential scheme."
However, preferential assessment programs are here to stay, be-
54. Nelson, supra note 49, at 223.
55. Clouser and Mulkey, supra note 25, at 10.
56. Comment, Assessment To Preserve Agricultural Land: With Application to the
Four-State Region of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska, 47 UMKC L. REV. 629, 633
(1978-79), citing Hady, Differential Assessment Programs for Agricultural Land, in LAND
USE: TOUGH CHOICES IN TODAY'S WORLD 114, 115 (1977).
57. Comment, supra note 56 at 634, citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, STATE
PROGRAMS FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND 2, 3 (1974).
See CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 51200-05.1 (Supp. 1982). For a similar program involving agricul-
tural districts, see supra notes 22-27. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2741 (1975 & Supp.
1982) (providing for contracts between farmers and local governments to fix the tax rate).
Michigan and Wisconsin have developed circuit breaker tax credit programs which allow for
a tax credit on the agricultural producer's state income tax which exceeds a certain percent-
age of farm income. Clouser and Mulkey, supra note 25, at 13-15.
58. Wershow, supra note 53, at 10-11.
59. See Myers, Farmland Preservation in a Democratic Society: Looking to the Future,
3 AGRIC. L.J. 605, 608 (1981-82). But see Currier, supra note 49, at 840 (stating that agricul-
tural preferential taxation does serve other purposes such as easing the income squeeze on
farmers and "exacerbat[ing] what farmers contend is already an unfair situation-that they
pay property taxes disproportionate to the public services they use that are supposedly
funded by the property tax."). Id.
60. Comment supra note 56, at 648 (stating that the uniformity clauses in many of the
state constitutions have presented problems for backers of preferential assessment
schemes). See, e.g. Switz v. Kingsley, 173 A.2d 449 (1961), aff'd as modified 182 A.2d 841
(N.J. 1962).
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cause of the needed and deserved tax break they give to the land
intensive industry, especially in states like Arizona, Florida and
California where the land usually includes a high speculative value.
5. Agricultural Zoning
Agricultural zoning is another way to preserve open space and to
prevent the destruction of important farmland."1 While a great
deal of effort has been made in establishing state programs in pref-
erential taxation,62 some contend that too little attention has been
paid to zoning as a means of saving agricultural land.63
Until recent years most of the agricultural zoning programs have
permitted small minimum lot sizes with an open-ended list of per-
mitted nonfarm uses.6 ' These statutes have been criticized as not
being effective because of the easy conversion to nonagricultural
uses.
At least twenty-seven states allow local jurisdictions to zone land
for agricultural uses." In addition, some states have begun experi-
menting with exclusive agricultural zoning which normally discour-
ages or actually prohibits nonfarm use.6 The use of exclusive agri-
cultural zoning has been touted as a way of excluding incompatible
uses if it is combined with minimum lot size requirements and a
limit on the number of building permits issued.
Most of the exclusive agricultural zoning plans currently in use
contain large minimum lot sizes, a restriction on nonfarm land uses
and other restrictions on development.
The size of the lot is probably the most crucial factor. Minimum
lot sizes range from less than one acre up to 640 acres.68 Of course,
care must be taken lest the large minimum lot size should result in
agricultural land turning into small country estates for urban
dwellers.s
61. 3 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 19.01[1 (1978).
62. See Juergensmeyer, Introduction: State and Local Land Use Planning and Control
in the Agricultural Context, 25 S.D.L. REV. 463, 464-65 (1980).
63. Id.
64. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 72. See also Juergensmeyer,
supra note 62, at 473 (stating that the result is much the same as in cumulative zoning).
665. Clayton and Mulkey, FRE 29, Exclusive Agricultural Zoning, University of Florida
(1980).
66. Id.
67. Batie and Looney supra note 3, at 608, citing Plant, Urban Growth and Agricultural
Decline, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (1978).
68. Batie and Looney, supra note 3, at 614.
69. Id.
1982]
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Some serious constitutional questions have been raised with re-
gard to agricultural zoning.70 Debate has been vigorous as to
whether agricultural zoning constitutes a "taking" without just
compensation under the fifth amendment.71 Equal protection ques-
tions have also been raised based upon the discriminatory effects
of size requirements. In addition, there have been a number of
cases concerning whether a particular activity constitutes "farm-
ing" as defined in the various statutes and ordinances.7
Today, zoning is one of the most frequently used land use de-
vices for controlling depletion of agricultural lands.7 4 However,
there has not yet been a solid indication of its effectiveness.
On the one hand, there are strong indications that agricultural
zones carefully laid out on the basis of accurate and complete
data on soil productivity, land tenure patterns, and agricultural
activity, can significantly change the expectations of both farmers
and potential developers regarding the development potential of
agricultural land. On the other hand, zoning is vulnerable to
change if there is a shift in political power.7 5
II. NUISANCE AND ITS RELATION TO AGRICULTURE
Very recently a large majority of the states have in rapid succes-
sion abrogated the right to bring a common law nuisance action
against farmers under certain circumstances.7 6 Most of the legisla-
70. "Generally, an agricultural zoning ordinance will be upheld if it 'is grounded upon a
health-community-welfare concept and bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes of
zoning."' Rohan, supra note 61, at 19.01[2], citing Hourun v. Township Comm. of Union,
238 A.2d 501, 504 (N.J. 1968); see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
71. Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919, 922 (1974).
72. Id.; but cf. County of Lake v. Cushman, 353 N.E.2d 399 (Ill. Ct. App. 1976) (county
could not under its zoning ordinance prevent landowner from building poultry barn on his
3.9-acre lot).
73. See, e.g., Jackson v. Building Inspector, 221 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1966) (holding that
the dehydration for general sale of manure actually produced on the land is proper as a
farming activity). But cf. Town of Lincoln v. Murphy, 49 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1943) (holding
that a 55 acre tract used solely for the raising of more than 2000 hogs was not a "farm"
within the meaning of the town's zoning ordinance).
74. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 62.
75. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 73.
76. ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (Supp. 1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1051---61 (Supp. 1981-
82); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-120-26 (Supp. 1981); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3482.5 (West Supp.
1982); 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-226 (Reg. Session); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1401 (Supp.
1980); 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 82-24 (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1982); IDAHO CODE
§§ 22-4501-04 (Supp. 1982); 1981 Ill. Legis. Serv. 82-509 (West); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-52-
4 (Burns Supp. 1982); IowA CODE ANN. § 172D (West Supp. 1981-82); 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws
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tion has been passed in the last three years. This rapid and dra-
matic action by the various state legislatures provides a significant
advantage for the farmer in his battle to save agricultural land.
This section will explore the nuisance action and the various stat-
utes and their effectiveness in abrogating nuisance liability as tools
in the state's overall program of preserving agricultural land.
A. The Nuisance Action
Common law nuisance is a confusing doctrine." Historically,
nuisance actions have been divided into two separate categories:
(1) private nuisance, which deals with the invasion of interests in
the use or enjoyment of land and (2) public nuisance, which ex-
tends to "virtually any form of annoyance or inconvenience inter-
fering with common public rights. 7' The two actions have little in
common, except that each involves the "element of harm, inconve-
nience or annoyance to someone. '7 9
Modern private nuisance actions can be traced to the action for
trespass on the case and the assize of nuisance. A private nuisance
action, a tort against land, must always be founded on the plain-
tiff's interest in the land. 80
Courts, when considering private nuisance actions, have at-
tempted to strike a balance between the plaintiff's right to use and
enjoy his premises and the defendant's privilege of making reason-
able use of his own property for his own benefit. "In every case the
court must make a comparative evaluation of the conflicting inter-
ests according to objective legal standards, and the gravity of the
Ch. 3, p.3; Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.072 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:1202 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (Supp. 1981-82); MD. CTS.
AND JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-308 (Supp. 1982-83); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 125A
(West Supp. 1981); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-30-
101, 45-8-111 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-401-02-4404 (Cum. Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 430-C (Supp. 1981); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1300-C (Consol. Supp. 1981-82); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-700-701 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-02 (Supp. 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1.1 (West Supp. 1981-82); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-.945 (1981); S.C.
CODE §§ 46-45-10-50 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1981); 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 609; TEX. CODE
ANN. § 251.001 et seq. (Vernon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-7 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5751 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 3.1-22.6---22.8 (Supp. 1982); WASH. RV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300-.905 (Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 11-39-101-104 (1977).
77. "It has meant all things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to every-
thing from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agree-
ment that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition." W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).
78. Id. at 572.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 (introductory note) (1977).
80. Id. at §§ 821D, 821E.
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harm to the plaintiff must be weighed against the utility of the
defendant's conduct."' L
There has never really been any question that farming activities
may constitute a nuisance.8 2 A plaintiff who brings a private nui-
sance action against a farmer must also show that the farmer's ac-
tivity is an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment
of the plaintiff's land.8s For example, in nuisance actions against
farmers, courts have considered a variety of factors, including the
character of the surrounding neighborhood, the location and prox-
imity of the farm to the plaintiff's home, the intensity and volume
of the odors, the interference with the plaintiff's well-being and
enjoyment and any consequential depreciation in the value of the
affected property."
A different analysis is used when a private litigant brings a nui-
sance action against a defendant for an activity which has been
deemed unlawful.8 The illegality of the activity forecloses the
court's consideration of the reasonableness of the defendant's con-
duct.86 In addition, the defendant's conduct may constitute both a
private nuisance and a public nuisance8
The public nuisance action, on the other hand, is designed to
allow the government to abate an activity which is injurious to the
health, safety or general welfare of the community."8 "It is not nec-
essary, however, that the entire community be affected, so long as
the nuisance will interfere with those who come in contact with it
in the exercise of a public right." Normally a condition or activity
which substantially interferes with the private interests of any con-
siderable number of individuals in a community also will interfere
with some public right.8 A public nuisance suit may be brought by
a private individual, but the damage that the plaintiff sustains
81. Prosser, supra note 77, at 596.
82. "[I]f a person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the houses of an-
other, that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air unwholesome, this is an
injurious nuisance, as it tends to deprive him of the use and benefit of his house." Yeager &
Sullivan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 324 N.E.2d 846, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), quoting Blackstone's
Commentaries, at 217.
83. 2 N. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 13.02(2), citing Jones v. Rumford, 392 P.2d 808
(Wash. 1964).
84. Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 1974).
85. McCarty & Matthews, Foreclosing Common Law Nuisance For Livestock Feedlots:
The Iowa Statute, 2 AGRic. L.J. 186, 194-95 (1980-81).
86. Id. at 195.
87. Id.
88. Id., citing Prosser, supra note 77, at 583-86.
89. Prosser, supra note 77, at 583, 585.
"RIGHT TO FARM" STATUTES
must be of a different kind than that suffered by society as a
whole.90
The plaintiff in a public nuisance action, usually a private indi-
vidual with special damages or a governmental body, has a higher
burden of proof than does a plaintiff in a private nuisance action.
This is because of the required proof of the public nature of the
harm."1
As with private nuisance actions, the court will consider a vari-
ety of factors including location, condition and frequency and
manner of operation of the activity. However, these factors are not
weighed against the benefit to the public in determining whether
the activity is reasonable. Rather, they are used only to help find
the injury to the public.9 2
In both private and public nuisance actions there are several ba-
sic ways in which relief may be granted. As in other tort actions, a
prayer for damages will be heard.' 3 In some cases, courts will in-
voke their equity powers and abate the activity by granting injunc-
tive relief if the damages available at law would not be adequate."
A new approach which has generated a great deal of discussion
was enunciated in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Develop-
ment Co.95. The court abated the activity but only after the plain-
tiff, who established a residential community near a previously ex-
isting cattle feedlot, indemnified the defendant for his loss."
90. Id. at 587. See Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706
(Ariz. 1972) ("It is clear that as to the citizens of Sun City, the operation of Spur's feedlot
was both a public and a private nuisance. They could have successfully maintained an ac-
tion to abate the nuisance. Del Webb, having shown a special injury in the loss of sales, had
a standing to bring suit to enjoin the nuisance.") But cf. McCollum v. Kolokotrones, 311
P.2d 780, 783 (Mont. 1957) (Plaintiff, who was not able to show special damages, was not
allowed to bring a suit to enjoin a chicken operation.)
91. Comment, "Ill Blows The Wind That Profits Nobody": Control of Odors From Iowa
Livestock-Confinement Facilities, 57 IOWA L. REv. 451, 464 (1971). But cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 821B, comment g (1977) (stating that some states have statutes defining a
public nuisance to include interference with "any considerable number of persons." Under
these statutes no public right need be shown.)
92. McCarty & Matthews, supra note 85, at 196.
93. Harl, supra note 83, at § 13.02(4).
94. Prosser, supra note 77, at 603. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970) (holding that no injunction would lie if the defendant paid permanent
damages).
95. 494 P.2d 700.
96. Id. at 708. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View Of The Cathedral, 85 H.Av. L. REv. 1089 (1972). (This article, a process of
a model articulated during the same year as Spur, came up with basically the same result.
The authors reasoned that the plaintiff would be protected by an injunction only if he gets
permission from the owner or pays damages in an amount to be judicially determined.) See
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For years courts have considered the idea of "coming to the nui-
sance" as a defense to nuisance actions, with varying results. 7 In
recent years the doctrine has not served as a complete bar to nui-
sance actions, " but has been considered in the balancing approach
used by the courts." In other words, "the safer and more accurate
statement would appear to be that 'coming to the nuisance' is
merely one factor, although clearly not the most important one, to
be weighed in the scale along with the other elements which bear
upon the question of 'reasonable use.'10o
At the same time, courts have continued to uphold nuisance ac-
tions against farmers even when they are conforming to applicable
health and safety standards. In Pendoley v. Ferreira, the Ferreiras
began the operation of a hog farm in 1949 in what was then a "ru-
ral community." 10 1 In later years the area grew. In fact, more than
thirty new homes were built near the farm. Although the hog farm
was one of the best operated in the state,' 2 the court granted the
new neighbors an injunction, and provided the Ferreiras a "reason-
able time" to find new premises. Although taking into account that
the Ferreiras were in the area first, the court placed great emphasis
on the fact that the injury to the farmers was "only economic"
while the material interference with the rights of the plaintiffs
[was] in the day to day use and comfort of the places where they
live."103
In the famous case of Spur Industries,'" an area some fourteen
or fifteen miles outside of Phoenix had been used primarily for
also Dukeminier and Krier, supra note 40, at 954; Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fun-
damental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977).
97. "If my neighbour makes a tan-yard so as to annoy and render less salubrious the air
of my house or gardens, the law will furnish me with a remedy [the nuisance coming to the
plaintiff]; but if he is first in possession of the air, and I fix my habitation near him, the
nuisance is of my own seeking, and may continue [the plaintiff coming to the nuisance]."
Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance," 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (1980), citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, 402 (17th ed. 1830); see Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 331 P.2d 539, 548 (Kan. 1958).
98. Kellog v. Village of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55 (Wisc. 1975).
99. Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co., 505 P.2d 919 (Or.
1973).
100. Prosser, supra note 77, at 611. See Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972 & Supp. 1981).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 840D (1977).
101. 187 N.E.2d 142, 144 (Mass. 1963).
102. "Their piggery is in the upper 5% to 10% of ... [comparable] piggeries insofar as
quality of operation is concerned." In addition, the Boxford board of health was "satisfied
with . . . [the] operation of the farm." Id. at 144.
103. Id. at 146.
104. 494 P.2d 700.
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farming since the early 1900's. By 1950 the only nearby urban ar-
eas were between two and three miles away. In 1956 a cattle feed-
lot operation was started in the area. Three years later Del Webb
started making plans for the development of an urban area known
as Sun City, a retirement village. He was able to purchase the land
at a much lower rate than he could have closer to Phoenix.105 At
the same time Spur began a rebuilding and expansion program ex-
tending both to the north and south of their original facilities. This
work was completed in 1962. Del Webb sold his first home in 1962,
some two and one-half miles north of Spur's facilities. Although
aware of the large feedlot operation, Del Webb continued building
south until 1967. Late that year he filed his original complaint al-
leging that more than 1,300 lots in the southwest portion were un-
fit for development because of the flies and the smell. 106
The court took an apparently novel approach to the case. In-
stead of opting for one of the traditional choices of damages or
injunctive relief1 07 the court required Spur to move, but only after
being indemnified by Del Webb.10 8
The court's rationale for this decision is exemplified by the fol-
lowing statement in its decision: "Spur is required to move not be-
cause of any wrongdoing on the part of Spur, but because of a
proper and legitimate regard of the courts for the rights and inter-
ests of the public."10 9 The court did not mention the public's inter-
est in retaining agricultural land.
The court explained its reason for requiring Del Webb to indem-
nify Spur when it stated:
It does not seem harsh to require a developer, who has taken ad-
vantage of the lesser land values in a rural area as well as the
availability of large tracts of land on which to build and develop a
new town or city in the area, to indemnify those who are forced to
leave as a result.110
Although the court took the middle road, a seemingly fairer result
than in Pendoley, the court's decision still had the effect of con-
verting the land to nonagricultural uses. The results in both of
105. Id. at 702-03. Del Webb paid only $570 per acre for the 20,000 acres of farmland he
purchased. Id. at 704.
106. Id. at 704-05.
107. See Hal supra note 83 at § 13.02(4).
108. 494 P.2d at 708.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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these cases are good examples of the basic problem. While agricul-
tural land is becoming scarce, courts are using the rather flexible
nuisance doctrine to effectively remove productive land from agri-
cultural uses.
Statutes have been passed in an effort to help halt the
trends-both the farmland conversion trend and the courts' ac-
tions in the nuisance area. In simplified form, the typical state
statute provides that a nuisance action cannot be brought against a
farm if the farmer has been in operation for a period greater than
one year and is not violating applicable health and safety
regulations."'
Most of this legislative action has been in recognition of the
farmer's value to society and because of the concern for the loss of
agricultural land." ' The statutes can also be viewed as a rejuvena-
tion of the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine.
Regardless of the justification the response has been overwhelm-
ing. Almost overnight the farmer has received some needed recog-
nition from nearly all of the state legislatures.
B. The Right to Farm Statutes
Although the statutes have been given various names, the most
eye-catching and strongest one in terms of exemplifying legislative
intent is "right to farm." '13 In all future references in this article,
the statutes abrogating the common law nuisance doctrine under
certain circumstances will be referred to as "right to farm" stat-
utes. Although each of the statutes has similarities, they can gener-
ally be broken down into two separate groups.11 4
1. Right to Farm for General Agricultural Operations
The most common type of right to farm statute provides that a
farming operation may not be declared a nuisance if it was not a
nuisance when it began, even if conditions have changed in the
area where the farm is located.11 5 States adopting this type of stat-
ute also normally provide that the agricultural operation must
111. E.g., 1982 Fla. Sess, Law Serv. 82-24 (West).
112. Many of the statutes refer to preservation of agricultural land as the reason for
their enactment. See infra notes 117-21.
113. 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 82-24 (West).
114. See Taylor and Quate, State Right To Farm Laws, American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, 1981.
115. Id.
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have been operating at least one year prior to the filing of the law-
suit and that the alleged nuisance does not involve water pollution
or flooding or result from the negligent conduct or improper opera-
tion of the agricultural activity.1 6
Most of the statutes in this group first set forth a policy declara-
tion or a legislative findings and purpose section.11 7 The most com-
mon is exemplified by Georgia's statute, which provides:
It is the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect and
encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural
land for the production of food and other agricultural products.
When nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas, ag-
ricultural operations often become the subject of nuisance suits.
As a result, agricultural operations are sometimes forced to cease
operations. Many others are discouraged from making invest-
ments in farm improvements. It is the purpose of this law.., to
reduce the loss to the State of its agricultural resources by limit-
ing the circumstances under which agricultural operations may be
deemed to be a nuisance.116
This policy declaration is broad and strong enough to show a
legislative intent to protect agricultural operations from encroach-
ing urbanization. Of course, since all of the statutes are new, the
impact of the various policy statements in showing legislative in-
tent is yet to be seen. However, in an unofficial opinion, the attor-
ney general of Georgia indicated that the owners who moved a
large egg farm into a residential area are not entitled to protection
under the statute.119 In attempting to determine the legislative in-
tent, the attorney general gave great weight to the policy
declaration.
The use of the phrases 'when nonagricultural land uses extend
into agricultural areas' and 'changed conditions in or around the
locality of [a previously existing agricultural operation'] indicates
that the General Assembly was directing this protection from nui-
116. Id.
117. However, several states in this group do not have policy declarations. Among them
are Alabama, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, Oregon and Utah.
118. GA. CoDE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1981). Of course, in those states having statutes without
policy declarations, the courts can utilize other tools in determining the legislative intent.
E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (Supp. 1981) contains no declaration of legislative intent. But see
Entertainment Ventures Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (holding that the
title of an act may be looked to in order to ascertain intent and remove uncertainty).
119. U80-51 Op. Att'y Gen. Georgia 473 (1980).
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sance suits to agricultural operations that are subject to encroach-
ment by nonagricultural land uses. 2 '
However, in this case the chicken farmer moved his operation to
the residential area so the owners would not be entitled to protec-
tion under the act.
By referring to the policy declaration, the Georgia attorney gen-
eral illustrated the great weight customarily given to policy decla-
rations and legislative findings when determining legislative intent.
Therefore, the clearer and stronger the statement, the less likely
there will be deviations from the statute's purpose.
In this regard, Vermont and Florida appear to have the strongest
policy statements. The Florida statute provides the following state-
ment of legislative policy:
The Legislature finds that agricultural production is a major con-
tributor to the state's economy; that agricultural lands constitute
unique and irreplaceable resources of statewide importance; that
the continuation of agricultural activities preserves the landscape
and environmental resources of the state, contributes to the in-
crease of tourism, and furthers the economic self-sufficiency of
the people of the state; and that the encouragement, develop-
ment, improvement and preservation of agriculture will result in
a general benefit to the health and welfare of the people of the
state. The Legislature further finds that agricultural activities
conducted on farm land in urbanizing areas are potentially sub-
ject to lawsuits based on the theory of nuisance, and that these
suits encourage and even force the premature removal of the farm
land from agricultural use. It is the purpose of this act to protect
reasonable agricultural activities conducted on farm land from
nuisance suits.""'
Even though the courts will often give great weight to it, the
policy declaration is not the main substance of any statute.
122
Most of the statutes in this group contain a list of definitions.
For example, Maine defines "farm," "farm operation," and "farm
product" very broadly.1 2 8 "Farm" is defined as the "land, buildings
120. Id. at 474.
121. 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 82-24 (West); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5751
(Supp. 1982).
122. If language used in the statute is understandable and plain, the court should gather
legislative intent from the language used and not resort to rules of statutory construction.
State ex rel. Appling v. Chase, 355 P.2d 631 (Or. 1960).
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (Supp. 1981-82).
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and machinery used in the commercial production of farm prod-
ucts." 2 ' "Farm products" are defined as "those plants and animals
useful to man and includes, but is not limited to forages and sod
crops, grains and food crops, dairy products, poultry and poultry
products, bees, livestock and livestock products and fruits, berries,
vegetables, flowers, seeds, grasses and other similar products."1 6
"Farm operation" is "a condition or activity which occurs on a
farm in connection with the commercial production of farm prod-
ucts.' 26 By providing a very broad list of definitions, the Maine
Legislature has extended the protection under the act to a large
number of farmers and agriculturists.1 7
Most of the statutes provide a one-year limitation on the bring-
ing of nuisance actions. The North Dakota statute is typical in this
regard:
An agricultural operation is not, nor shall it become, a private or
public nuisance by any changed conditions in or about the local-
ity of such operation after it has been in operation for more than
one year, if such operation was not a nuisance at the time the
operation began."'
Mississippi, on the other hand, has developed a slightly stronger
statement:
In any nuisance action, public or private, against an agricultural
operation, proof that said agricultural operation has existed for
one (1) year or more is an absolute defense to such action, if the
conditions or circumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance have
existed substantially unchanged since the established date of
operation.' 9
Although states such as Mississippi have made strong state-
ments about "absolute defense," others state only that the agricul-
tural activities are presumed to be reasonable and not a nuisance.
For example, the Vermont statute provides:
Agricultural activities conducted on farmland, if consistent with
124. Id. at subsection 1A.
125. Id. at subsection 1C.
126. Id. at subsection lB.
127. For a similar but slightly broader list of definitions see 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 82-
24 (West).
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-02 (Supp. 1981)
129. MIss. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (Supp. 1981).
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good agricultural practices and established prior to surrounding
non-agricultural activities, shall be entitled to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the activity is reasonable and does not constitute a
nuisance. If an agricultural activity is conducted in conformity
with federal, state, and local laws and regulations, it is presumed
to be good agricultural practice not adversely affecting the public
health and safety. This presumption may be rebutted by a show-
ing that the activity has a substantial adverse effect on the public
health and safety.""0
A few states have adopted a one-mile radius standard instead of
the one-year limitation. 81 The state of Washington has adopted a
unique position by protecting against government over-regulation
in addition to the normal protection against nuisance actions.1 3 2
One of the major problems in most of these statutes will be the
determination of an "established date of operation." Although
many of the statutes are silent on the subject, several states have
attempted to provide in-depth criteria and standards for the courts
to use. Mississippi provides:
'Established date of operation' means the date on which the
agricultural operation commenced operation. If the physical facil-
ities of the agricultural operation are subsequently expanded, the
established date of operation for each expansion is deemed to be
a separate and independent "established date of operation" es-
tablished as of the date of commencement of the expanded opera-
tion and the commencement of expanded operation shall not
divest the agricultural operation of a previously established date
of operation.""8
Florida's version is slightly different:
If the farm operation is subsequently expanded within the orig-
inal boundaries of the farm land, the established date of opera-
tion of the expansion shall also be considered as the date the orig-
inal farm production commenced. If the land boundaries of the
farm are subsequently expanded, the established date of opera-
tion for each expansion is deemed to be a separate and indepen-
130. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5753 (Supp. 1981). See also OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1.1
(West Supp. 1981-82); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-1061 (Supp. 1981-82).
131. See, e.g., 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 609.
132. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300-.905 (Supp. 1982).
133. MIss. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (Supp. 1981).
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dent established date of operation.'3 4
Many of the states also provide that the statute does not apply
when the farming or agricultural operation is conducted
negligently. 38
Some of the states also provide for exceptions. By expressly pro-
viding for exceptions in their statutes, the legislatures are appar-
ently attempting to limit the inroads by the courts.'3 6 This is evi-
dent in the Florida statute which has a rather unique list of
exceptions:
The following conditions shall constitute evidence of a nuisance:
1. The presence of untreated or improperly treated
human waste, garbage, offal, dead animals, dangerous waste
materials or gases which are harmful to human or animal
life.
2. The presence of improperly built or improperly main-
tained septic tanks, water closets, or privies.
3. The keeping of diseased animals which are dangerous
to human health unless such animals are kept in accordance
with a current state or federal disease control program.
4. The presence of unsanitary places where animals are
slaughtered which may give rise to diseases which are harm-
ful to human or animal life.137
Finally, some of the statutes in this group contain a severability
clause,"3 ' and a contract clause providing that the act only applies
to contracts entered into after the statute was passed.'
2. Right to Farm for Specific Agricultural Activities
The second group of statutes serve to protect specific types of
activity. The Iowa statute," 0 enacted in 1976," provides an abso-
lute defense to nuisance suits against livestock feedlots if the feed-
134. 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 82-24 (West).
135. E.g., S.C. CODE § 46-45-30 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1981) in relevant part provides: "The
provisions of this section shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or
improper operation of any such agricultural operation or its appurtenances."
136. See Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976) (applying the doctrine expressio
unius est exclusio alterius).
137. 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 82-24 (West).
138. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.900-.905 (Supp. 1982).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700-01 (Supp. 1981).
140. IOWA CODE ANN. § 172D (West Supp. 1982-83).
141. Iowa was the first state to enact a "Right to Farm" statute.
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lots are in compliance with state environmental regulations and
zoning ordinances. Enacted with the support of the Iowa Pork Pro-
ducers' Association and the Iowa Cattlemen's Association" and
over the objection of the Iowa Attorney General,143 the statute has
apparently been a success. 
1 4
The statute is based upon the common law defense of "coming
to the nuisance":
In any nuisance action or proceeding against a feedlot brought by
or on behalf of a person whose date of ownership of realty is sub-
sequent to the established date of operation of that feedlot, proof
of compliance with [applicable environmental and zoning laws)
shall be an absolute defense, provided that the conditions or cir-
cumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance are subject to regula-
tory jurisdiction in accordance with [applicable environmental
and zoning laws],1"
Massachusetts takes a slightly different approach. The same pro-
vision that provides for a board of health to abate farm activities
also provides "that the odor from the normal maintenance of live-
stock or the spreading of manure upon agricultural and horticul-
tural lands shall not be deemed to constitute a nuisance.
'1 46
The Connecticut legislature also decided to specifically list the
types of agricultural activity protected. Its statute provides that
the following activities will not be deemed a nuisance if the one-
year requirement has been met:
(1) odor from livestock, manure, fertilizer or feed, (2) noise from
livestock or farm equipment used in normal, generally acceptable
farming procedures, (3) dust created during plowing or cultivation
operations, (4) use of chemicals, provided such chemicals and the
method of their application conform to practices approved by the
Commissioner of Environmental Protection or, where applicable,
the Commissioner of Health Services, or (5) water pollution from
142. McCarty & Matthews, supra note 85, at 187 n.1.
143. The Iowa Attorney General questioned the constitutionality of the statute. Op.
Iowa Att'y Gen. 451 (1976). His concerns were apparently not heeded by the state legisla-
ture. For a thorough analysis of the constitutional issues regarding the abrogation of the
nuisance doctrine see McCarty & Matthews, supra note 85, at 197-207.
144. Since the statute was enacted no successful cases have been reported in Iowa where
nuisance actions were brought against farmers who are in conformance with the prescribed
regulations.
145. IowA CODE ANN. § 172D.2 (West Supp. 1981-82).
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 125A (West Supp. 1981). See MONTANA CODE ANN.
§§ 27-30-101, 45-8-111 (1981).
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livestock or crop production activities, except the pollution of
public or private drinking water supplies. " '
In requiring the farmer to conform to accepted agricultural ac-
tivities, the state took a rather unusual approach by providing a
statutory standard of prima facie evidence that the farm follows
generally accepted agricultural practices. "1 8
Maryland protects only those agricultural operations used for:
(1) Cultivation of land;
(2) Production of agricultural crops;
(3) Raising of poultry;
(4) Production of eggs;
(5) Production of milk;
(6) Production of fruit or other horticultural crops, and
(7) Production of livestock.'
By using the term "agriculture" instead of "farm" the Maryland
Legislature potentially expanded the protection of the statute. 50
However, any expansion is surely curtailed by limiting it to the
seven areas of agricultural work.
III. CONCLUSION
The farmer, who once was seen as the backbone of this coun-
try15' now holds a less worthy place in the minds of many Ameri-
cans. 1 2 Nonetheless, the farmer is an unusually proud person.
Farmers have stood strong in their convictions and have fought
against many problems. However, the forces against the farmer are
beginning to win the battle, with economic problems causing much
of the loss of agricultural land. 53 Placed at the mercy of the supply
147. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-226 (Reg. Session).
148. Id.
149. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-308(a) (Supp. 1981).
150. Jackson v. Building Inspector, 221 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Mass. 1966).
151. "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God." KORPELA, FEDERAL
FARM LAW MANUAL, § 2, 2 (1956), (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
152. "The average American takes his food and fiber supply very much for granted
.... When some thought is given to the human element in the production of these items,
the 'farmer' is vaguely and inconsistently conceived of as a cross between a noble visionary
worthy of residence on the banks of Walden Pond and a country bumpkin growing fat on
government subsidies." Wershow and Juergensmeyer, Agriculture and Changing Legal Con-
cepts In An Urbanized Society, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 78 (1974-75).
153. See Wershow, supra note 3. See also Batie and Looney, supra note 3.
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and demand system'" with the prospects of continuing price sup-
ports, government aid' 55 and helpful regulations looking bleak'"
the chances of the small-and average-size farmer improving his
rather small profit margin do not appear promising.1 57 Instead of
continuing to operate at a small or even a negative profit ratio,
thousands have sold their farms and set aside many years of hard
work, dedication and love for the land."' At the same time, Ameri-
can farmers have responded to market demands and have begun
cultivating more and more land as the call for United States agri-
cultural exports increases. 59 Both of these factors are leading to
the loss of agricultural land.
Another factor leading to the loss of agricultural land is urban-
ization. 60 "The steady annual rate of urban conversion, coupled
with its permanence and the high quality of land typically affected,
makes urbanization the greatest single threat to the agricultural
land base nationwide."''
Nonetheless, things may be changing. Starting with the passage
of the Maryland Preferential Assessment Tax in 1956, the nation
154. Wershow, supra note 3.
155. The Farmers Home Administration, an agency of the United States Department of
Agriculture, has more than ten different loan programs for American farmers, ranging from
farm ownership to soil and water loans. This Is FmHA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, PROGRAM AID NUMBER 973, August 1980.
156. The Reagan administration has proposed drastic cuts in both the price support and
farm aid program. See From the Schools to the Sewers, TIME, March 2, 1981, at 16. But cf.
High Cost of a Helping Hand, TIME March 2, 1981, at 25 (stating that many people are
critical of continued spending by FmHA.)
157. A free market would result in considerable price and income instability with farm
income going down. Frederick, Federal Price and Income Support Programs for Agricul-
ture-Some Alternatives, 2 AGRIC. L.J. 1, 9 (1980-81); but cf. Harrison, Parity, Politics and
Procedures-A Proposal for Reform in Determining Parity for the Dairy Industry, 21
S.D.L. REV. 617 (1976) (concluding that the current system leaves parity determination
open to political pressures).
158. Of course, many additional factors contribute to the farmer's economic problems. A
perfect example is fluctuating weather patterns with a lack of insurance protection for such
contingencies. See Comment, Federal Crop Insurance: An Investment in Disappointment? .,
7 U. KAN. L. REV. 361 (1958-59). Another area of increasing concern in the agricultural
industry is labor regulation. See Haughton, The Influence of Labor-Management Relations
on the Settlement of Agricultural Disputes, 35 ARB. J. No. 2, 3 (1980). See also Levy, Col-
lective Bargaining for Farmworkers-Should There Be Federal Legislation?, 21 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 333 (1981). For an analysis of the coverage of agricultural workers under
minimum wage laws, unionization laws, worker's compensation laws and occupational safety
laws, see Uchtmann & Bertagnolli, The Coverage of the Agricultural Worker In Labor Leg-
islation: Deviations From the Norm, 2 AGRIC. L.J. 606 (1980-81).
159. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, supra note 1, at 8.
160. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
161. Geier, supra note 5, at 658-59.
"RIGHT TO FARM" STATUTES
has started to recognize once again the value of the farmer to soci-
ety. Within the past three years many of the states have reaffirmed
their support by abrogating the right to bring a common law nui-
sance action against farmers.""
Those statutes, however, may do no more than serve as a pat on
the back. In order for a statute to be effective in retaining agricul-
tural land, a state must do two things. First the statute must be
strong enough and clear enough to prevent misinterpretation by
the courts. This can be accomplished by a strong legislative find-
ings section, by expressly providing for exceptions and by not pro-
viding for weak notions of presumptions. The states must also real-
ize that the "right to farm" statutes cannot operate in a vacuum.
The right to farm cannot be protected by one single statute. The
statute must be part of an overall farmland preservation program
including preferential taxation, agricultural districts, development
rights programs and zoning.
162. One mechanism not discussed in this comment received a great deal of attention
recently when, on November 2, 1982, voters of the state of Nebraska approved by a 57-43%
margin a "save-the-farm" amendment to the Nebraska Constitution prohibiting non-family
corporations from buying farm or ranch lands in the state. Nebraska is the only state to
have passed such an amendment.
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